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I. Introduction
A joint venture has been defined for antitrust purposes as
"essentially any collaborative effort among firms, short of a
merger, with respect to [research and development], produc-
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tion, distribution, and/or the marketing of products or servic-
es." As will be seen below, a joint venture can produce
significant benefits for both consumers and producers by taking
advantage of economies of scale or by adding a competitive
force to the market.2 However, it would be unwise from a
competition standpoint to exempt joint ventures from antitrust
laws altogether; the cooperation inherent in mostjoint ventures
presents opportunities for collusion and other anticompetitive
conduct, and can reduce competition in the marketplace if
participants in the venture are foreclosed from competing with
one another.' The task of antitrust laws, in the international
arena as well as domestically, is to distinguish good ventures
(i.e., those with overall procompetitive effects) from bad ones.
In this article, I present a survey of the major antitrust
considerations which need to be taken into account when
planning a joint venture with some crossborder element, i.e.,
where a foreign partner is involved or where the venture in
question is to be consummated (in whole or in part) in a
foreign country. I will focus on the antitrust laws of the United
States and the European Community (EC), as two of the world's
largest and most important consumer and producer markets,
and as jurisdictions which often attempt to combat anti-
competitive conduct occurring outside their respective territo-
ries.4 Reflecting an earlier incarnation of this article, and in
line with the general theme of this Symposium issue of the
William Mitchell Law Review, I will also describe selected Chinese
1. Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
1988 § 3.4 (Nov. 10, 1988), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109 [hereinafter
1988 International Guidelines]. For a more detailed discussion of the 1988 International
Guidelines, see Joseph P. Griffin, U.S. International Antitrust Enforcement: A Practical Guide
to the Justice Department Guidelines, Corp. Prac. Series (BNA) No. 53, at B-801 (Apr. 12,
1995).
In April 1995, the Department ofJustice and Federal Trade Commission replaced
the 1988 International Guidelines with a new set of international antitrust enforcement
guidelines. See Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelinesfor International Operations 1995 (April 5, 1995), reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,107 [hereinafter 1995 International Guidelines]. The 1995 International
Guidelines are less comprehensive in their coverage than the 1988 version, and
therefore this article makes reference to both versions, as appropriate in the
circumstances.
2. See infra text accompanying note 35.
3. See infra text accompanying note 36.
4. See infra parts II.A, IV.A.1, V.A.1, V.B.1, V.C.1, and VIA (United States), and
parts I.B, IVA2, V.A.2, V.B.2, V.C.2, and VI.B (EC).
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antitrust-type-laws (albeit somewhat briefly).' Also discussed (as
jurisdictional issues) are "blocking" and "clawback" statutes,6
and recent attempts at antitrust cooperation.7
Antitrust law in the 1990s consists of a vast and complex
maze of rules and policies, so I have deliberately confined the
scope of this article to providing a survey of the major issues that
arise for joint ventures with some international element.
However, I have listed in a bibliography a series of secondary
sources that provide further, more detailed guidance on the
specifics of issues discussed herein and on antitrust laws in
general.' Consideration of U.S. state and EC member state
antitrust laws may also be necessary for a complete antitrust
analysis of many international joint ventures, but a discussion of
these is beyond the scope of this article.9
II. Background: Antitrust Laws in Context
It is important to remember that antitrust laws do not exist
in a vacuum but rather are founded (in most cases) on carefully
thought out underlying policies, most usually revolving around
the need to promote competition to ensure the efficient
allocation of resources in a free market economy.10 Given the
5. See infra parts II.C, V.A.3, V.B.3, V.C.3, and VI.C.
6. See infra part IV.B.
7. See infra part IV.C.
8. See infra Appendix: Further Reading.
9. For surveys of U.S. state antitrust laws, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
ANTITRUST LAW SECTION, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES (Michael L.
Denger et al. eds., 1990); RALPH H. FOLSOM, STATE ANTITRUST LAW AND PRACTICE
(1995); WILLIAM T. LIFLAND, STATE ANTITRUST LAW (1994); 13 & 14JULIAN 0. VON
KALINOWSKI ET AL., ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION (1994). For surveys of
selected foreign antitrust laws, see INTERNATIONAL MERGERS: THE ANTITRUST PROCESS
(J. William Rowley & Donald I. Baker eds., 1991) (with particular reference to merger
control); 8 VON KALINOWSKI.
10. For example, "[flor more than a century, the U.S. antitrust laws have stood as
the ultimate protector of the competitive process that underlies our free market
economy. Through this process, which enhances consumer choice and promotes
competitive prices, society as a whole benefits from the best possible allocation of
resources." 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1. See also 1988 International
Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1 ("The U.S. antitrust laws are the legal embodiment of our
nation's commitment to a free market economy. The competitive process, unimpeded
by privately and governmentally imposed barriers, ensures the most efficient allocation
of our resources and the maximization of consumer welfare."); Gordon v. New York
Stock Exchange, Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975) ("IT]he sole aim of antitrust legislation
is to protect competition . .. ."); United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610
(1972) (describing antitrust laws as "the Magna Carta of free enterprise" and
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intensely factual nature of much antitrust analysis,' recalling
these underlying policies in their proper context can greatly
facilitate assessment of the antitrust implications of a given
venture.
A. United States: The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution vests in
Congress jurisdiction "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States ... ." Broadly speak-
ing, the Commerce Clause was intended to prevent states from
imposing discriminatory restrictions on products and services
from other states, and more generally to deal with the interstate
economic chaos under the Articles of Confederation which had
resulted in part from the loss of a trading relationship with
Britain.12 When Congress enacted federal antitrust legislation
just over a hundred years later, it intended to exercise its
Commerce Clause power to the fullest possible extent, both
domestically and internationally."
B. European Community: The Common/Internal Market
The EC is one of three Communities which together make
up the European Union (EU): the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), set up by the Treaty of Paris in 1952 to
create a common market in coal and steel; 4 the European
Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), set up by the Treaty of
Rome in 1958 to provide for the development of atomic energy
for peaceful purposes; 5 and the European Economic Commu-
nity, set up by a separate Treaty of Rome in 1958 to create a
emphasizing their importance to the free-enterprise system).
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
12. 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.3, at 368-69 (2d ed. 1992).
13. United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945); see also
Taxi Weekly, Inc. v. Metropolitan Taxicab Bd. of Trade, 539 F.2d 907, 910 (2d Cir.
1976) ("[1]nterstate commerce for the purposes of the Sherman Act is coterminous
with interstate commerce under the Constitution.").
14. TREATY OF PARIS ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY,
as amended (1951).




European common market, 6 and renamed the "European
Community" (or EG) by the Maastricht Treaty on European
Union in 1993.7 The EU Treaty provides that the EU is to be
"founded on" the original Communities." However, the latter
are still very much in place, and therefore continued use of
"EC" is entirely appropriate in both historical and contemporary
contexts. The EU currently has fifteen member states: Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. 9 Austria, Finland, and Sweden
joined as ofJanuary 1, 1995, and will be in a "transitional" phase
for several years to come. °
One of the primary activities of the EC has been to establish
a common market in goods and services. Indeed, the establish-
ment of "an internal market characterized by the abolition, as
between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of
goods, persons, services and capital," is one of the purposes
enumerated in the EC Treaty." Another such listed purpose
requires the establishment of "a system ensuring that competi-
tion in the internal market is not distorted."2" Competition
16. TREATY OF ROME ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, as amended (1957)
[hereinafter EC TREATY], reprinted in Treaty of Rome Consolidated and the Treaty of
MAASTRICHT (Neville M. Hunnings &Joe M. Hill eds., 1992) (reprinted from [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573). All references herein to the EC Treaty are to the Treaty as amended
through January 1, 1995.
17. TREATY OF MAASTRICHT ON EUROPEAN UNION art. G.A(1) (1992) [hereinafter
EU TREATY], reprinted in HUNNINGS.& HILL, supra note 16, at 719. For an overview of
the EU Treaty, see RICHARD CORBETr, THE TREATY OF MAASTRICHT (1993); Michael H.
Abbey & Nicholas Bromfield, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maastricht Treaty, 15 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 1329 (1994).
18. EU TREATY, supra note 17, art. A.
19. See Treaty Concerning the Accession of the Kingdom of Norway, the Republic
of Austria, the Republic of Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden to the European
Union, 1994 O.J. (C 241) 9 [hereinafter 1994 Accessions Treaty]. In November 1994,
Norwegians voted narrowly (and for the second time in just over 20 years) against
membership. See Sweden Votes forEUMembership But Norway Says No, DOING BUS. IN EUR.
(CCH), Dec. 5, 1994, at 1.
20. See 1994 Accessions Treaty, supra note 19, passim.
21. EC TREATY, supra note 16, art. 3(c). Completion of this market through the
abolition of direct and indirect barriers to trade in goods and services was one focus
of the "1992" Internal Market project. See generally RICHARD OWEN & MICHAEL DYNES,
THE TIMES GUIDE TO 1992 (2d ed. 1990); CLIFFORD CHANCE, THE CCH GUIDE TO 1993:
CHANGES IN EC LAW (2d ed. 1990); CLYDE HUFBAUER, EUROPE 1992 (1990).
22. EC TREATY, supra note 16, art 3(g).
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policy (i.e., antitrust) is therefore seen in the EC as a necessary
corollary to the creation of a true common market; there would
be little point in establishing such a market if national econo-
mies could continue to be isolated by restrictive trade practic-
es. 23
Recent years have seen the extension of EC antitrust
principles beyond the borders of the member states of the EC.
The EC has entered into "association agreements" with third
countries;24 these are intended in principle to be stepping
stones to full EC membership and often contain provisions
relating to competition policy. 5 Perhaps of most note recently
is the 1992 Agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA)
concluded among the ECSC, the EEC (as it then was), Euratom,
EC member states, and certain European Free Trade Association
countries pending the acceptance of the latter into the EC.
26
The EEA Treaty was reduced somewhat in importance early in
1995 when Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined the EC/EU, but
will continue to be of significance in relation to Iceland, Norway,
and Liechtenstein. The EEA Treaty's antitrust provi-
sions-which parallel those contained in (and promulgated
under) the EC Treaty-will not be discussed separately in this
article but will be cited in footnotes where relevant.
27
C. China: The Anti-Unfair Competition Law
In response to a U.S. threat to impose trade sanctions on
China because of its failure to protect U.S. investors' intellectual
23. See DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, WYATT & DASHWOOD'S EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY LAW 377-78 (3d ed. 1993).
24. EC TREATY, supra note 16, art. 238 (authorizing the EC to conclude association
agreements with third countries and international organizations).
25. See, e.g., Thinam Jakob, EEA and Eastern European Agreements With the European
Community, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW & POLICY 403 (Barry Hawk ed., 1992)
(discussing competition provisions in the European Economic Area Agreement (see
infra note 26 and accompanying text) and in the "Europe" Agreements).
26. Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994 OJ. (L 1) 3, as adjusted at
1994 OJ. (L 1) 572 [hereinafter EEA TREATY]. On the EEA Treaty, see SVEN NORBERG
ET AL., THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA: EEA LAw (1993); Sven Norberg, The EEA
Agreement: Institutional Solutions For a Dynamic and Homogeneous EFA in the Area of
Competition, in INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAw & POLICY, supra note 25, at 437 (with a
focus on competition rules).
27. The EEA's antitrust provisions are found in Articles 53-60, Protocols 21-24, and
Annex XIV of the EEA Treaty. See supra note 26.
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property rights, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted the Anti-Unfair Competition Law on
September 2, 1993.28 The Anti-Unfair Competition Law, which
entered into force on December 1, 1993, provides legal protec-
tion for unregistered trademarks, trade names, product packag-
ing, trade dress, and trade secrets. 29 The Anti-Unfair Competi-
tion Law also outlaws certain other unfair trading practices
relevant to the subject matter of this article, and these are
outlined in greater detail below.'0 In general, acts of unfair
competition are defined for these purposes as violations of the
Anti-Unfair Competition Law which injure the lawful rights of
other business operators and which disrupt the social and
economic order.31
Given China's primarily non-market oriented economy, the
presence in the Anti-Unfair Competition Law of antitrust-type
provisions designed to protect certain aspects of free competi-
tion may seem somewhat incongruous. However, in spite of
recent evidence of a slowdown in momentum, market (and
political) reforms in China are continuing to take place. 2
Furthermore, the degree of protection conferred by the Law is
rather limited when compared to U.S. and EC antitrust princi-
ples,"3 and this obviously parallels the fact that the develop-
28. Anti-Unfair Competition Law adopted at the Third Session of the Standing
Committee of the Eighth National People's Congress on Sept. 2, 1993, and effective
from Dec. 1, 1993, translated and reprinted in CHINA L. & PRAC., Nov. 18, 1993, at 31, 31-
37 [hereinafter Anti-Unfair Competition Law]. The Anti-Unfair Competition Law is
also selectively translated, reprinted, and analyzed in TianlongYu, An Anti-Unfair Compe-
tition Law Without a Core: An Introductory Comparison Between U.S. Antitrust Law and the
New Law of the People's Republic of China, 4 IND. INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 315 (1994). Full
text translations herein are taken from the first-listed source.
29. Simon T. Joseph, Jr., Damning the Counterfeit Trade; Protection Laws for Foreign
Trademark Owners, CHINA BUS. REv., Nov. 1993, available in NEXIS, NEWS Library,
ASAPII File.
30. See infra parts V.A.3, V.B.3, and V.C.3.
31. Anti-Unfair Competition Law, supra note 28, art. 2, second paragraph; see also
Yu, supra note 28, at 317.
32. For recent surveys of economic and political reforms in China, see A Vacancy
Awaits: A Survey of China, ECONOMIST, Mar. 18, 1995 (U.S. ed.) (center pages survey);
Financial Times Survey: China, FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 7, 1994, Survey.
33. SeeYu, supra note 28, at 323-28, for a more detailed comparison of the antitrust
provisions contained in the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and their U.S. counterparts.
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ment of a market/price mechanism in China is still at a
relatively early stage. 4
III. Overview: Joint Ventures and Antitrust Laws
A. Joint Ventures
The concept of a 'joint venture" covers such a broad array
of cooperative arrangements that coming up with an all-encom-
passing definition of the term for antitrust purposes is not always
easy.35 However, a typical joint venture will generally involve
most of the following elements: (1) community of interest in the
performance of the common purpose of the venture; (2) joint
control or right of control; (3) joint proprietary interest in the
subject matter; (4) a right to share in the profits; and (5) a duty
to share in any losses that may be sustained.36 It goes without
saying that a joint venture need not be separately incorporated
but rather may be effected simply by the pooling of assets in an
unincorporated association of one sort or another.
The relevance for present purposes of classification as a
joint venture is that joint ventures which do not have as their
only or primary purpose a clearly-illegal ("naked") restraint of
trade can expect to receive favorable antitrust treatment from
the relevant enforcement authorities of both the United States
and the EC. 37 The reason for this is that there is little doubt
in most quarters that a joint venture can have significant pro-
competitive benefits, summarized by one commentary as follows:
1. When the venture parents create a new offspring they
establish a new competitive entity in the marketplace.
This entity increases productive economic activity and
may foster competition where none previously existed.
2. The joint venture may enable the parents as well as the
offspring to enter new markets which neither or only
34. See id, at 320 (the Anti-Unfair Competition Law provides protection for the
development of a market mechanism).
35. The Department of Justice has nevertheless come up with a definition. See
supra text accompanying note 1 (definition in 1988 International Guidelines).
36. 3 VON KALINOWSK, supra note 9, § 25.08[1] n.1; cf. ZOLMAN CAVITCH, 2
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 41.01 (1991) (distinguishing joint ventures from
partnerships on the ground that the former usually, but not necessarily, are limited to
a single transaction).
37. See infra parts VAI (United States), V.A.2 (EC).
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one could have entered individually. Thus,joint activity
at one level may permit competition at another level.
3. The joint venture may result in economies of scale and
thereby produce capacity that would have been unavail-
able if each participant performed the same function
separately.38
However, it would be unwise from a competition standpoint to
exempt joint ventures from antitrust laws altogether; the
cooperation inherent in mostjoint ventures presents opportuni-
ties for collusion and may have other anticompetitive side
effects:
1. One or both of the parents might have entered the field
occupied by the offspring if the venture had not been
formed. If so, the venture reduces potential competi-
tion, and heightens barriers to market entry.
2. Because of the increased opportunity for collusion
occasioned by the venture, the parents may become less
willing and less able to behave as arm's-length competi-
tors in other spheres of activity.
3. The parents may curb the full competitive potential of
their offspring in order to protect their own existing
markets and/or customers.
4. A firm not involved in the joint venture may be fore-
closed from entry into the market because of the
strength of the joint venturers and/or their offspring or
may be foreclosed from doing business with the off-
spring because the parents monopolize its capacity.
5. The joint venture itself may not produce any anti-
competitive effects, but the parties involved may have
entered into the venture as part of a larger restrictive
agreement to, for example, fix prices or divide geo-
graphic markets.3 9
Virtually all cooperative economic activity-much of it very
beneficial-restrains competition to one degree or another.
4
0
The role of the antitrust laws, therefore, is to weigh up the
procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of the venture and
separate "good" ventures from "bad" ones.
38. Joseph P. Griffin & Michael R. Calabrese, U.S. Antitrust Considerations of
Transnationl Joint Ventures, in INTERNATIONALJOINT VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH
TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND ABROAD 295, 296 (David N.
Goldsweig & Roger H. Cummings eds., 1990).
39. Id.
40. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
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B. Jurisdictional Issues
Even if a venture is planned or executed wholly outside the
United States, U.S. antitrust laws may apply if the venture will
affect commerce there.4  The antitrust laws of any other
country in which the venture is to be consummated or have
effect will also have a bearing on the analysis (in the context of
this article, Chinese law). The venture should be scrutinized
carefully to ascertain whether the laws of yet other jurisdictions
may be involved. For example, the EC (like the United States)
has regularly asserted jurisdiction to regulate allegedly anticomp-
etitive conduct by firms outside the EC, on the basis of various
"effects" tests.42
Also relevant to jurisdictional questions are the so-called
"blocking" and "clawback" statutes found in the laws of a
handful of foreign countries. Aimed primarily at perceived
excesses of jurisdiction by the United States in the antitrust,
export controls, and securities laws areas, these statutes purport
to permit foreign persons to block U.S. antitrust discovery orders
and "claw back" the non-compensatory portion of any treble
damages or other punitive award made in a U.S. court.43 Some
of these statutes also deny enforcement of any part of a U.S.
judgment which contains a treble damage or other punitive
component." To deal with these (and related) conflicts over
jurisdiction, and to provide for mutual assistance in internation-
al antitrust enforcement, the United States has entered into
international antitrust cooperation agreements with a handful of
other jurisdictions.'
C. Types of Antitrust Prohibition
The fact that an arrangement constitutes ajoint venture will
not by itself preclude analysis under any particular antitrust
prohibition (though it may result in the analysis being more
favorable to the arrangement in question). It is therefore
important not to omit consideration of any of the possible
41. See infra part IVA1.
42. See infra part IVA2.
43. See infra parts IV.B.1, IV.B.2.
44. See infra part IV.B.3.
45. See infra part IV.C.
[Vol. 21
IN7ERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS
antitrust problems. At the risk of some oversimplification, most
anticompetitive conduct prohibited by antitrust laws can be put
into one or more of the following categories, listed in the order
of their relative importance to joint ventures:
* Loose combinations (cooperation in restraint of trade). The
cooperative behavior between actual or potential competi-
tors inherent in many joint ventures usually results in
assessment of such ventures as agreements which affect or
restrain trade in some way.' The illegality analysis usually
involves weighing up the likely procompetitive effects of the
proposed venture against those aspects that are likely to
restrain competition.47
* Tight combinations (mergers and acquisitions). Where the
participants in a joint venture engage in closer, more
permanent behavior involving (for example) a partial or
full joinder of operations, the acquisition or exchange of
assets or stock, or other concentrative conduct, some type
of merger or similar analysis may be necessary.' Typically
this will involve assessing whether the transaction is likely to
give the shared assets or resulting combination the ability
to exercise excessive market power in a defined product
and/or geographic market.49
In order to assist monitoring of tight combinations, such
combinations which exceed certain thresholds are typically
required to be notified to the relevant antitrust enforce-
ment authority.
50
• Monopolization/Abuse of dominant position (abuses of market
power). Monopolization and related prohibitions most often
(though not always) relate to single-firm conduct and are
usually not a problem for joint ventures as such.51 Con-
46. See, e.g., Sherman Act of 1890 § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(United States); EC TREArY, supra note 16, art. 85 (EC).
47. See infra parts V.A.1 (United States), V.A.2 (EC).
48. See, e.g., Clayton Act of 1914 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (United States);
Council Regulation 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations
Between Undertakings, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1, corrected at 1990 O.J. (L 257) 14 (EC)
[hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
49. See infra parts V.B.1 (United States), V.B.2 (EC).
50. See, e.g., Clayton Act of 1914 § 7a, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(United States) (see infra part V.B.1.c); Merger Control Regulation, supra note 48, art.
4 (EC) (see infra part V.B.2.d).
51. See, e.g., Sherman Act of 1890 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)
(United States) (see infra part V.C.1); EC TREATY, supra note 16, art. 86 (EC) (see infra
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centrative conduct between more than one party is more
properly assessed as a tight combination.
Certain "predatory" conduct which may or may not involve
multi-firm cooperation and which tends to create a monop-
oly may fall foul of other antitrust laws, for example, price
discrimination and tying arrangements.
52
It is also worth remembering that other (non-antitrust)
unfair trade practice legislation may be relevant in the interna-
tional context, such as laws authorizing the imposition of
antidumping duties.5' A discussion of such other legislation is
beyond the scope of this article.54
D. Enforcement
Virtually all antitrust laws are enforced through the civil
(i.e., non-criminal) law by antitrust authorities: by the Depart-
ment ofJustice (DoJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
in the United States, and by the Commission of the European
Communities (EC Commission) in the EC.55 Private parties
can also bring civil actions, though to a lesser extent in the EC
than in the United States.56 In the United States, particularly
egregious antitrust violations may also be actionable by criminal
57prosecution.
part V.C.2).
52. See Clayton Act of 1914 §§ 2, 3, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 14 (1988).
53. See Tariff Act of 1930 §§ 731-751, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1673-1675 (1988 & Supp. V
1993) (United States); Council Regulation 3283/94 on Protection Against Dumped
Imports From Countries Not Members of the European Community, 1994 O.J. (L 394)
1 (EC); see also ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (John M.
Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989). Antidumping laws deserve particular
mention because of their close conceptual links to antitrust policy. At this time,
however, only the former (and not the latter) are subject to full-scale international
trade regulation. See A Borderline Case ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 1994, at 73 (U.S. ed.)
(arguing in favor of extending GATT/WTO international trade rules to competi-
tion/antitrust); see also GABRIELLE Z. MARCEAU, ANTIDUMPING AND ANTITRUST ISSUES IN
FREE TRADE AREAS (1994); Christopher Kent, The Unsettled Business: Should Antidumping
Laws Be Replaced By Competition (Antitrust) Laws Under Free Trade?, 32 ALTA. L. REV. 722
(1994).
54. For a list of other types of such legislation, see 1995 International Guidelines,
supra note 1, § 2.8.
55. See infra part VI.
56. See infra part VI.







Commerce clause jurisdiction extends both to activities
within the flow of interstate (and foreign) commerce and to
activities which substantially affect the flow of such commerce.5"
In practice, the U.S. federal government generally has been
permitted to exercise jurisdiction to regulate (i) the activities of
U.S. citizens, wherever situated, and (ii) the activities of non-U.S.
citizens which affect commerce within, into, and out of the
United States.59 However, the conduct in question must have
some effect or consequence within the United States before the
courts will accept jurisdiction under U.S. antitrust laws.6' This
clearly includes conduct that was meant to produce and did in
fact produce some substantial effect on import commerce into
the United States.6 Until 1982, however, there was a good
deal of confusion as to the appropriate test to apply to conduct
involving U.S. non-import commerce. 62
In 1982, Congress enacted legislation designed to clarify the
confusion surrounding the extraterritorial application of U.S.
antitrust laws with respect to non-import commerce. Amend-
58. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312
U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
59. Ramirez & Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146 F. Supp. 594, 600
(S.D. Cal. 1956).
60. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. [Alcoa], 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir.
1945); see also 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.11 (jurisdiction over
conduct involving import commerce). Under the Foreign Relations Restatement, the
United States has jurisdiction to regulate anticompetitive conduct which (i) is carried
out in significant measure in the United States, (ii) is carried out predominantly
outside the United States if a principal purpose of the conduct is to interfere with U.S.
commerce, or (iii) has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce. See RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 (1986)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. Categories (ii) and (iii) are applications of Alcoa's effects
doctrine. Id § 415 cmt. a.
61. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993).
62. See generally 1 VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 9, § 5.02[1] (providing an overview
of pre-1982 law in this regard).
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ments made to the antitrust laws by the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1982 provide in part that the provisions of
the Sherman Act (and the Clayton Act, by virtue of Section 1
thereof) 63 are not to apply to conduct involving non-import
trade or commerce with foreign nations unless such conduct has
a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" on (i)
U.S. domestic trade or commerce, (ii) U.S. import trade or
commerce, or (iii) the U.S. export trade or commerce of a
person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United
States.' Another provision applies a similar rule to the FTC's
jurisdiction under the Federal Trade Commission Act.65 Thus,
the antitrust laws no longer apply to conduct, the principal
effects of which are felt wholly outside the United States; rather,
the conduct must have a "direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect" on trade with or within the United States. '
b. Exceptions and Limitations
Even where jurisdiction may properly be asserted under the
foregoing rules, it may be declined on the basis of one or more
of several exceptions and limitations. Those exceptions and
limitations with specific international relevance are described
below.
i. Comity
Comity is the broad international counterpart of "full faith
and credit,"67 and its application involves assessing, as a matter
of judicial or administrative discretion, "the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive
or judicial acts of another nation.. . ." For example, the DoJ
and FTC have indicated that they will take into account the
63. 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1988).
64. Id. § 6(a).
65. Id. § 45(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
66. See generally Harold K. Schmidt, The Extraterritorial Application of the United States
Antitrust Laws, 2J.L. & COM. 321 (1985); Barry E. Hawk, InternationalAntitrust Policy and
the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need for Reassessmen 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201 (1982).
67. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988).
68. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
[Vol. 21
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAWS
following factors when assessing whether it would be appropriate
to decline jurisdiction on the basis of comity:
69
* the relative significance of conduct within the United States,
as compared to conduct abroad;
* the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct;
* the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consum-
ers, markets, or exporters;
* the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of
the conduct on the United States as compared to the effects
abroad;
* the existence of reasonable expectations that would be
furthered or defeated by the action;
* the degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign
economic policies;
* the effect on enforcement activities of another country; and
* the effectiveness of foreign enforcement.
ii. Foreign Sovereign Immunity
An agency or instrumentality of a foreign state is not
generally subject to U.S. antitrust jurisdiction in U.S. courts.7y
This rule admits numerous exceptions, such as where (i) the
state has waived its immunity, or (ii) the state is engaged in
certain commercial activities.71
iii. Act of State
As a matter of comity, U.S. courts will refuse jurisdiction
over conduct which is the act of or compelled by a foreign
sovereign, where adjudication of any claims or issues would
require the court to judge the legality of the act in question.72
69. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.2; see also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 60, § 403 & cmt. a (describing "reasonableness"-type limitations on countries'
rights to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over extraterritorial conduct).
70. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1988). The
doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity actually has its roots in the common law and
surfaced in the United States in the Supreme Court case of The Schooner Exchange
v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116 (1812) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over
French Emperor in action for forcible seizure of ship owned by U.S. citizen).
71. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
72. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries, 649 F.2d 1354, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1981).
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iv. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
Also as a matter of comity, conduct which is compelled by
a foreign government within its own territory will not give rise
to antitrust liability.73 However, compliance with both the
foreign law and U.S. antitrust law must be impossible before
foreign sovereign compulsion can be invoked as a defense.
74
v. Export Trade Exemptions
Other limited exemptions apply to activities aimed at U.S.
export trade. Thus, associations formed for the purpose of
engaging in export trading activities under the Webb-Pomerene
Act of 1918 have some limited immunity from the Sherman
Act,75 and producers and suppliers covered by the Export
Trading Company Act of 1982 enjoy broader immunity from
U.S. antitrust laws.76
c. Administrative Enforcement Policy
The DoJ most recently issued definitive, comprehensive
statements of its international antitrust enforcement policy in
the 1988 International Guidelines and in the 1995 International
Guidelines (issued jointly with the FTC) .7 ' These provide a
good overview of the major U.S. antitrust prohibitions as they
apply internationally and of agency enforcement policy in this
arena. However, neither set of Guidelines is intended to be a
restatement of the law and should therefore not be read as
such.78
Even before the Clinton Administration took office in early
1993, international antitrust enforcement efforts were being
stepped up, and recent events seem to confirm this trend. In
73. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
74. Id. at 2911.
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1988). On the Webb-Pomerene Act, see Wilbur R.
Fugate, The Export Trade Exception to the Antitrust Laws: The Old Webb-Pomerene Act and the
New Export Trading Company Act, 15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 673 (1982).
76. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4011-4021 (1988). On the Export Trading Company Act, see
Fugate, supra note 75; Dennis Unkovic,Joint Ventures and the Export Trading Company Act,
5J. L. & CoM. 373 (1985).
77. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 1; 1988 International Guidelines, supra
note 1.
78. 1995 International Guidelines, supra note 1, § 1; 1988 International Guidelines,
supra note 1, § 1.
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